Contact Publications Working Papers Teaching Curriculum Vitae (pdf)
Georg Kirchsteiger
Welcome to my website. I am Professor of Microeconomics at the European Center for Advanced Research in Economics and Statistics (ECARES), Université libre de Bruxelles. I received my PhD from the University of Vienna. Before I moved to Brussels in 2004, I worked at the universities of Vienna, Tilburg, and Maastricht.
My research interests are in the fields of behavioral economics, experimental economics, game theory, industrial economics, and microeconomics in general. In 2000 I received the Hicks-Tinbergen Award of the European Economic Association (with Ernst Fehr and Arno Riedl).
I teach graduate microeconomics, behavioral economics, and game theory.
ContactECARES, Université Libre de Bruxelles E-mail: georg.kirchsteiger@ulb.be
Office: Av. FD Roosevelt 42, R42.6.203 Mail: Av. FD Roosevelt 50, CP 114/04
1050 Brussels, Belgium
Kirchsteiger G., Lenaerts, T., & Suchon, R., (2026). Voluntary versus mandatory information disclosure in the sequential prisoner’s dilemma. Economic Theory, 25, 253-302. doi.org/10.1007/s00199-024-01563-y
Kirchsteiger, G., & Larch, M. (2025). The enforcement dilemma of EU fiscal rules. Economics & Politics, 37 (2), 699-708. doi.org/10.1111/ecpo.12334
Alós-Ferrer, C., Kirchsteiger, G., & Buckenmaier, J. (2022). Do
Traders Learn to Select Efficient Market Institutions? Experimental
Economics, 25, 203-228. doi.org/10.1007/s10683-021-09710-1
Di Guida, S., Han, T., Kirchsteiger, G.,
Lenaerts, T., & Zisis, I. (2021). Repeated
interaction and its impact on cooperation and surplus allocation - an
experimental analysis. Games, 12(1), 25. (Supplementary
Material). doi.org/10.3390/g12010025
Domingos, E., Grujić, J., Burguillo, J.,
Kirchsteiger, G., Santos, F., & Lenaerts, T. (2020). Timing
uncertainty in collective risk dilemmas encourages group reciprocation and
polarization. iScience, 23(12). doi.org/10.1016/j.isci.2020.101752
Dufwenberg, M., &
Kirchsteiger, G. (2019). Modelling Kindness.
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization,
167, 228-234. doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2018.07.014
Aldashev, G.,
Kirchsteiger, G., & Sebald, A., (2017). Assignment procedure
biases in randomized policy experiments. Economic Journal, 127, 873–895. doi.org/10.1111/ecoj.12321
Alós-Ferrer,
C., & Kirchsteiger, G. (2017). Market selection by
boundedly-rational traders under constant returns to scale. Economic
Letters, 153, 51-53. doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2017.02.008
Conconi,
P., DeRemer, D., Kirchsteiger, G., Trimarchi, L., & Zanardi, M.
(2017). Suspiciously
timed trade disputes. Journal of International Economics, 105, 57-75. doi.org/10.1016/j.jinteco.2016.12.001
Kirchsteiger, G., Mantovani, M., Mauleon, A., &
Vannetelbosch, V. (2016). Limited
farsightedness in network formation. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 128, 97-120. doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2016.05.016
Zisis, I., Di Guida, S., Han, T., Kirchsteiger, G.,
& Lenaerts, T. (2015). Generosity
motivated by acceptance - evolutionary analysis of an anticipation game. Scientific
Reports, 5, 18076. doi.org/10.1038/srep18076
Alós-Ferrer,
C., & Kirchsteiger, G. (2015). Learning and
market clearing: Theory and experiments. Economic Theory,
44(3), 339-360. doi.org/10.1007/s00199-009-0466-9
Karle, H.,
Kirchsteiger, G., & Peitz, M. (2015). Loss
aversion and consumption choice: Theory and experimental evidence. American
Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 7(2), 101–120. doi.org/10.1257/mic.20130104
Dufwenberg, M., &
Kirchsteiger, G. (2014). Reciprocity and the ultimatum game. In: How Werner Güth's ultimatum game shaped our understanding of social behavior (E. van Damme et al.), Journal of
Economic Behavior & Organization, 108,
292-314. doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2014.10.014
Dufwenberg, M., Heidhues, P., Kirchsteiger, G., Riedel, F., & Sobel, J.
(2011). Other-regarding
preferences in general equilibrium. Review of Economic Studies, 78(2), 613-639. doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdq026
Alós-Ferrer,
C., & Kirchsteiger, G. (2010). General
equilibrium and the emergence of (non)market clearing trading institutions.
Economic Theory, 44(3), 339-360. doi.org/10.1007/s00199-009-0466-9
Kirchsteiger, G., &
Sebald, A. (2010). Investments
into education - Doing as the parents did. European Economic Review, 54(4), 501–516. doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2009.09.004
Alós-Ferrer,
C., Kirchsteiger, G., & Walzl, M. (2010). On the
evolution of market institutions: The platform design paradox. Economic
Journal, 120(543), 215-243.
doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0297.2009.02297.x
Kirchsteiger, G., Rigotti, L. & Rustichini, A.
(2006). Your
morals might be your moods. Journal
of Economic Behavior & Organization,
59(2), 155-172. doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2004.07.004
Kirchsteiger, G., Niederle,
M., & Potters, J. (2005). Endogenizing market institutions: An experimental approach.
European Economic Review, 49(7), 1827-1853; doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2004.05.006
Huck, S., Kirchsteiger, G., & Oechssler, J. (2005). Learning
to like what you have - Explaining the endowment effect. Economic
Journal, 115, 689-702. (Technical
Appendix). doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0297.2005.01015.x
Burda, M., Güth, W., Kirchsteiger, G., & Uhlig, H. (2005). Employment
duration and resistance to wage reductions: Experimental evidence. Homo
Oeconomicus, 22(2), 169-189
Dufwenberg, M., & Kirchsteiger, G.
(2004). A
theory of sequential reciprocity. Games and Economic Behavior, 47(6), 268-298. doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2003.06.003
Kirchsteiger, G., &
Prat, A. (2001). Inefficient
equilibria in lobbying. Journal of Public Economics, 82(3),
349-375. doi.org/10.1016/S0047-2727(00)00134-1
Kerschbamer, R.,
& Kirchsteiger, G. (2000). Theoretically
robust but empirically invalid? An experimental investigation into tax
equivalence. Economic Theory, 16(3), 719-734
Dufwenberg, M., & Kirchsteiger, G.
(2000). Reciprocity
and wage undercutting. European Economic Review, 44(4-6),
1069-1078. doi.org/10.1016/S0014-2921(99)00047-1
Güth, W.,
Kirchsteiger, G., & Ritzberger, K. (1998). Imperfectly
observable commitments in n-player games. Games and Economic Behavior, 23(1), 54-74. doi.org/10.1006/game.1997.0602
Fehr, E., Kirchsteiger, G., & Riedl, A. (1998). Gift
exchange and reciprocity in competitive experimental markets. European
Economic Review, 42(1), 1-34. doi.org/10.1016/S0014-2921(96)00051-7
Puppe, C., & Kirchsteiger, G. (1997). On
the possibility of efficient private provision of public goods through
government subsidies. Journal of Public Economics, 489-504. doi.org/10.1016/S0047-2727(97)00029-7
Fehr, E., Gächter,
S., & Kirchsteiger, G. (1997). Reciprocity
as a contract enforcement device: Experimental evidence. Econometrica, 65(4), 833-860. doi.org/10.2307/2171941
Puppe, C., & Kirchsteiger, G. (1997). On
the formation of political coalitions. Journal of Institutional and
Theoretical Economics, 153(2), 293-319
Fehr, E., Gächter,
S., & Kirchsteiger, G. (1996). Reciprocal
fairness and noncompensating wage differentials. Journal
of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 152(4), 608-640
Puppe, C., & Kirchsteiger, G. (1996). Intransitive
choices based on transitive preferences: The case of menu-dependent information.
Theory and Decision, 41(1), 37-58. doi.org/10.1007/BF00134115
Fehr, E., Kirchsteiger, G., & Riedl, A. (1996). Involuntary
unemployment and non-compensating wage differentials in an experimental labour
market. Economic Journal, 106, 106-121. doi.org/10.2307/2234934
Kirchsteiger, G. (1994). The role of envy
in ultimatum games. Journal of Economic Behavior
& Organization, 25(3), 373-389. doi.org/10.1016/0167-2681(94)90106-6
Fehr, E., & Kirchsteiger, G. (1994). Insider
power, wage discrimination, and fairness. Economic Journal,
104, 571-583. Reprinted in: Behavioral
Macroeconomics, Ian McDonald (ed.), Edward Elgar Publishing, 2012. doi.org/10.2307/2234632
Fehr, E., Kirchsteiger, G.,
& Riedl, A. (1993). Does
fairness prevent market clearing? An experimental investigation. Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 108(2), 437-459. doi.org/10.2307/2118338
Kirchsteiger, G., Lenaerts, T., & Suchon, R. (2025). Growing cooperation. CEPR Discusssion Paper 20326
Aghadadashli, H.,
Kirchsteiger, G., & Legros, P. (2021). Cheap talk is
not cheap: Free versus costly communication. CEPR
Discusssion Paper 15843
Bouton, L., &
Kirchsteiger, G. (2015). Good rankings are
bad: Why reliable rankings can hurt consumers. NBER Working Paper 21083
Game Theory with Applications to Economics (ECON-S412)
Graduate Microeconomics I (ECON-S510)
Behavioral Economics (ECON-S513)
Graduate Microeconomics III (ECON-S519)